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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the United States House of Representatives passed the
Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act.1 The Act purports
to safeguard the interests of consumers and employees by
invalidating all predispute arbitration agreements and predispute
joint-action waivers in the context of employment, consumer,
antitrust, and civil rights disputes.2 The FAIR Act was sponsored
almost exclusively by Democrats3 and was passed along mostly
partisan lines.4 Although the bill was stalled in a Republicancontrolled Senate, the new Democrat majority will likely view it
more favorably. President Biden has shown interest in banning at
least some predispute arbitration agreements,5 so the bill’s fate will
likely depend on its reception in committee and its proponents’
ability to circumvent the filibuster.
The FAIR Act may be well intended, but a blanket ban on
predispute arbitration agreements could bar access to efficient
means of dispute resolution and unnecessarily bog down the
traditional litigation system. Even accepting the prevailing
criticisms of predispute arbitration agreements, a more moderate
solution would likely be more palatable to differing ideologies,
protect individuals6 from predatory corporate behavior, and allow
parties to craft the dispute resolution process to suit their needs.
This Note proposes such a solution in the form of an “opt-in”
framework for enforcing arbitration agreements. Under this
framework, predispute arbitration clauses would be enforced only
if they were separately signed or clicked by the individual on an
elective basis.

1. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019).
2. Id. § 402(a).
3. Cosponsors: H.R. 1423—116th Congress (2019–2020), CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1423/cosponsors (last visited Mar.
24, 2021).
4. 165 CONG. REC. 7,852 (2019).
5. The Biden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and
Unions, BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/ (last visited Mar.
24, 2021) (describing then-Candidate Biden’s plan to “ensure workers can have their day in
court by ending mandatory arbitration clauses imposed by employers on workers”).
6. For purposes of this Note, the smaller parties to arbitration agreements (such as
employees and consumers) will be referred to as “individuals” while larger parties (such as
employers, banks, and consumer goods businesses) will generally be referred to
as “companies.”

1648

1649

Opt-In Arbitration

This Note first examines the rise and widespread adoption of
arbitration in American law and commerce to illustrate why such
clauses have become a focus of reform advocates. It will then
consider some of the policy values behind arbitration law, as well
as the benefits and disadvantages that might affect parties’ decision
to arbitrate. Finally, it will propose, analyze, and respond to
potential critiques of an “opt-in” framework as a preferable
alternative to both the status quo and the blanket ban proposed by
the FAIR Act.
I.

THE STATE OF ARBITRATION IN AMERICA

To understand the firmly established position of arbitration in
the United States, it is necessary to examine the history of the
Federal Arbitration Act and its interpretation by the United States
Supreme Court.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), enacted in 1925, made
predispute arbitration agreements enforceable in the United
States.7 In enacting this law, Congress was motivated at least partly
by the widespread “agitation against the costliness and delays of
litigation.”8 The FAA was also “designed ‘to overrule the
judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to
arbitrate’”9 by placing those agreements “upon the same footing as
other contracts.”10 Section 2 of the FAA, which forms part of the
“core” of its fifteen sections,11 provides the following:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon

7. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.
8. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 2 (1924).
9. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474
(1989) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1985)).
10. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1 (1924).
11. Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or
Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CORP. L. 331, 335 (1996).
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such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.12

Section 1 clarifies that “commerce” refers to interstate and
international commerce.13 It further limits the scope of the statute
by clarifying that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”14
The history surrounding the FAA’s enactment suggests that
Congress may have intended it to apply primarily to disputes
between experienced merchants.15 But even if this was the intent of
the legislature, it failed to clearly incorporate that intent into the
statutory text.16 Any attempt to construe the FAA as only applying
to agreements between sophisticated commercial actors is thus
bound to meet little success.
The extent to which the FAA preempts state law is another
question. The final clause of § 2, known as the “Savings Clause,”17
exempts state contract law from preemption.18 Thus, courts must
12. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
13. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
14. Id.
15. Shortly after the FAA was passed, Julius Cohen, one of its primary drafters, coauthored a law review article emphasizing the exclusive utility of arbitration for esoteric
commercial transactions:
[Arbitration] is a remedy peculiarly suited to the disposition of the ordinary
disputes between merchants as to questions of fact . . . . It has a place also in the
determination of the simpler questions of law . . . which arise out of these daily
relations between merchants . . . . It is not a proper remedy for what we may call
casual questions—questions with which the arbitrators have no particular
experience and which are better left to the determination of skilled judges with a
background of legal experience and established systems of law.
Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265,
281 (1926) (emphasis added). This focus on transactions between merchants seems to be
further supported by the testimony of the FAA’s proponents in congressional hearings.
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm.
of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 6 (1924) (statement of Charles Bernheimer,
Chairman, Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York)
(discussing the value of arbitration for businesspeople and merchants); see also Margaret L.
Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 170 (2010) (discussing
the historical use of arbitration as a means for businesspeople to seek adjudication through
someone with greater industry expertise than a regular jurist).
16. The text of § 2 requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements connected to
maritime transactions or those “involving commerce.” Although this language places
emphasis on commercial bargains, it never explicitly limits itself to transactions between
merchants or those parties with relatively equally bargaining power.
17. Brafford, supra note 11, at 336.
18. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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apply state law to determine whether an arbitration agreement is
enforceable and to resolve such questions as unconscionability and
fraud in the inducement.19 But the text of the FAA does not state to
what extent it preempts other state law.20 This issue has been the
subject of evolving analysis by the United States Supreme Court, as
will be discussed below.21
B. Interpretation by American Courts
1. Preemption by the FAA generally
Since its enactment, the FAA has been the subject of a series of
interpretive decisions by American courts which have gradually
but dramatically expanded its scope to reflect a “national policy
favoring arbitration.”22 At first, the FAA was treated as only
applying to federal courts.23 But in a chain of cases24 culminating
in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing, the
Supreme Court characterized the FAA as substantive, rather than
procedural law, and held that the FAA would replace state law in
determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements in federal
diversity cases.25
Then the Court took the dramatic step of determining that the
FAA applied to state courts so long as the contract involved
interstate commerce.26 In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court stated
that, “[i]n enacting § 2 . . . Congress . . . withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”27
The Court further determined that “Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability
of arbitration agreements.”28 Thus, under the Constitution’s

19. Brafford, supra note 11, at 336.
20. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
21. See infra Section I.B.
22. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
23. Thomas Burch, Necessity Never Made a Good Bargain: When Consumer Arbitration
Agreements Prohibit Class Relief, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1012 (2004).
24. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
25. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967).
26. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10–11.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id. at 16.
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Supremacy Clause,29 state laws that conflicted with the FAA were
implicitly preempted.30
The Court continued extending its preemption jurisprudence
when defining the phrase “involving commerce” in § 2.31 The Court
had interpreted Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce
extremely broadly,32 and in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the
Supreme Court extended that reasoning to the FAA’s “involving
commerce” language.33 This phrase, the Court reasoned, “normally
signals Congress’ [sic] intent to exercise its Commerce Clause
powers to the full.”34 Thus, although not every agreement might
appear to involve interstate commerce, those with even a remotely
commercial component fall under the FAA’s broad coverage.35
The Court later held that any state-law requirement for
arbitration agreements is valid only if it applies to contracts
generally.36 In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the Court
addressed a Montana law which required contracts containing
arbitration provisions to provide notice “in underlined capital
letters on the first page of the contract” that the agreement was
“subject to arbitration.”37 The Court held that the FAA preempts
state laws insofar as they place arbitration agreements in “a class
apart” from other contracts.38 In other words, the Savings Clause of
§ 2 does not exempt state laws that “singl[e] out arbitration

29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
30. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (explaining that a state law is preempted when it “stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress”).
31. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
32. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (quoting United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)) (“The commerce power is not confined in
its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over
it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the
effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce.”).
33. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74 (1995).
34. Id. at 273 (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)).
35. See id.; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.
36. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996).
37. Id. at 683 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)).
38. Id. at 688.
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provisions for suspect status.”39 Because the Montana law
specifically targeted arbitration agreements with heightened notice
requirements, the FAA overrode the state law and the arbitration
provision was enforceable.40
Consistent with this favorable stance toward arbitration, the
Court has narrowly construed the § 1 exemption for employment
contracts of “workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”41
by determining that it only applies to transportation workers.42
Employment arbitration agreements in virtually every other
industry are therefore enforceable under the FAA.
2. Class action waivers
The Supreme Court has also liberally enforced waivers of the
right to join in class actions found in many predispute arbitration
agreements.43 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, consumers
argued that the class arbitration waiver in their cell phone contract
was unconscionable.44 In finding for the consumers, the Ninth
Circuit had used generally applicable state contract law,45 which
would seemingly be exempt from preemption under the FAA’s
Savings Clause.46 Even so, the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the Savings Clause does not “preserve state-law rules that
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives.”47 Because, among other things, class arbitration is
“slower” and “more costly” than bilateral arbitration,48 it hindered
the FAA’s objective of “facilitat[ing] streamlined proceedings” and
was therefore preempted.49
The Court resolved a similar issue in an employment context in
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.50 There, employees argued that class
action waivers violated their right under the National Labor

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 682 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
Id. at 687.
9 U.S.C. § 1.
Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
See infra Section II.G.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337–38 (2011).
Id. at 338.
See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Doctor’s Ass’ns., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996).
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 344.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
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Relations Act (NLRA) “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.”51 The NLRA classifies it as an unfair labor practice “to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise” of this
right.52 All the same, the Court held that this language does not
show “a clear and manifest congressional command to displace the
Arbitration Act.”53 Therefore, this landmark case established that
class action waivers were fully enforceable in employment settings
as well.54
3. Adhesive contracts
Arbitration provisions are often found in boilerplate contracts
provided by businesses to consumers and employees. These
contracts are adhesive, meaning that they are offered on a take-itor-leave-it basis in transactions with sizable disparities in
bargaining power between the parties.55 Although these power
disparities make adhesive predispute agreements susceptible to
criticism, existing law provides little basis for invalidating them on
that basis alone. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains
that “[a] bargain is not unconscionable merely because the parties
to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor even because the
inequality results in an allocation of risks to the weaker party.”56
Along with most of the cases already discussed, in which the
relevant contracts were likely adhesive, the Supreme Court
specifically rejected an argument to invalidate an arbitration
agreement based on the mere risk of unequal bargaining power in
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.57 This decision was based on
the absence of “the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power
that would provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract.’”58
So courts will generally enforce adhesive agreements unless there
is a finding of actual coercion.59
51. Id. at 1625 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
53. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1624.
54. See id.
55. Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
57. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
58. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 627 (1985)).
59. Id.
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In view of this long line of cases overwhelmingly favoring
arbitration in the United States, any attempts to curb arbitration
agreements based on interpretation of the FAA are likely to face
insurmountable obstacles.
C. Practical Impact of Arbitration Policy
As a result of the consistently favorable approach that
American courts have taken toward arbitration, the use of
predispute agreements has steadily grown. The share of workers
who have entered such agreements has doubled since the early
2000s and now exceeds 55%, or around 60 million American
employees.60 Companies with 1,000 or more employees use
predispute arbitration agreements more often than other
employers, as do low-wage workplaces and those with
disproportionately large populations of women and African
American workers.61
These agreements are even more prevalent in consumer
settings.62 A 2015 study by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) found that 53% of outstanding credit card loans
were attributed to issuers that used predispute arbitration
agreements.63 For prepaid cards, which are usually used by
lower-income individuals,64 more than 82.9% of the market
required arbitration.65 It is likewise required by 85.7% of student
loan contracts and 98.5% of the storefront payday loan market66—
both of which disproportionately affect low-income and minority

60. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION 1 (2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/144131.pdf.
61. Id.
62. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE
ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC 16 (2015), https://files.epi.org/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf.
63. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
§ 1028(A) § 2, at 7 (2015).
64. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 62, at 16.
65. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 2, at 7.
66. Id.
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demographics67—along with 99.9% of the mobile wireless market.68
Considering both the widespread use of these agreements and the
judiciary’s expansive interpretation of the FAA, it makes sense that
reform efforts are being directed at the legislature.
II.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION

Next, it is useful to examine the considerations that might affect
parties entering predispute arbitration agreements. Although such
agreements tend to favor larger parties, they still present some
potential advantages for individuals. A consumer or employee
could therefore have enough incentives to consent rationally to
arbitration under the right terms.
A. Efficiency
The arbitration process is generally much more streamlined
than classic litigation.69 For instance, arbitration excludes such
steps as motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment,
interrogatories, depositions, and appeals.70 Parties can contractually
tailor the dispute resolution process by including or excluding
steps according to their needs.71 The average arbitration process
thus takes a little more than a year, while litigation sometimes
lasts more than five years.72 This increased efficiency not only
has positive implications for the parties themselves, but for the
67. See Judith Scott-Clayton & Jing Li, Black-White Disparity in Student Loan Debt More
than Triples After Graduation, EVIDENCE SPEAKS REPS., Oct. 20, 2016, https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/es_20161020_scott-clayton_evidence_
speaks.pdf; S. ILAN GUEDJ, BATES WHITE ECON. CONSULTING, REPORT REVIEWING RESEARCH
ON PAYDAY, VEHICLE TITLE, AND HIGH-COST INSTALLMENT LOANS 6–7 (2019),
https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Report-reviewing-researchon-payday-vehicle-title-and-high-cost-installment-loans.pdf.
68. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 2, at 7.
69. Seth E. Lipner, Is Arbitration Really Cheaper?, FORBES (July 14, 2009), https://
www.forbes.com/2009/07/14/lipner-arbitration-litigation-intelligent-investingcost.html.
70. Id.
71. See John S. Kiernan, Reducing the Cost and Increasing the Efficiency of Resolving
Commercial Disputes, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 187, 210–11 (2018) (“Parties can further agree on
rules that strictly constrain or eliminate expensive discovery, that substitute depositions with
parties’ advance presentation of their witnesses’ direct testimony by written affidavit . . . ,
and that set strict timetables for written submissions and hearings . . . . The terms of the
resulting ADR provisions . . . can be as customized and idiosyncratic as the parties’
imaginations and preferences may dictate.”).
72. Lipner, supra note 69.
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judicial system more broadly. Arbitration diverts cases from
already overwhelmed judicial dockets,73 thereby shortening wait
times and directing disputes toward forums better suited for their
procedural needs.
B. Lower Costs
On a similar note, arbitration is usually cheaper than
litigation.74 Although taxpayers subsidize certain aspects of
litigation,75 arbitration entails fewer “process costs” such as “forum
fees, litigation expenses, out-of-pocket attorneys’ fees, time, and
energy devoted by the parties.”76 Since arbitration offers less room
for complexity than litigation does, process costs are often lower.77
As with efficiency, this aspect of arbitration can benefit both
parties. For a hypothetical construction dispute, one group of
experts estimated that a claimant would incur 27% lower total costs
in arbitration than in litigation.78 Of course, these numbers vary
widely depending on the complexity and cost of a dispute,79 but
arbitration is generally the more cost-effective alternative for
both parties.80

73. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS., https:// www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018; see also Dominick T. Gattuso, The
U.S. District Court: Managing A Busy Docket, DEL. LAW., Summer 2013, at 8 (examining the
caseload of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware).
74. Susan Zuckerman, Comparing Cost in Construction Arbitration & Litigation, 62 DISP.
RESOL. J. 42 (2007) (comparing costs of arbitration and litigation in hypothetical
construction dispute).
75. Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 435–36 (2010) (“[T]he fact that a
contract does not include an arbitration clause does not indicate that litigation is more
efficient than arbitration, but only that parties prefer a subsidized dispute resolution process
to an unsubsidized one.”).
76. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1247, 1267 (2009).
77. Id. at 1268.
78. Zuckerman, supra note 74, at 44. Mediation, on the other hand, would save ninety-two
percent of the total costs of litigation. See id.
79. Id. at 48.
80. Lipner, supra note 70.
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C. Confidentiality
Arbitration is also generally confidential: there is no public
record of the arbitration proceedings or of the ultimate settlement.81
Additionally, contracts sometimes contain express provisions
requiring parties to keep documents, awards, and even the names
of the parties confidential.82
This characteristic offers advantages to companies over
individuals. By keeping arbitration proceedings behind closed
doors, defendants can shield the subject matter of the dispute—
which is often unfavorable to the company—from the public eye.
Granted, this privacy might sometimes be desirable for plaintiffs as
well, especially in cases of sexual harassment or other matters that
deal with delicate facts. But victims of discrimination, physical
injury, or other harms must seek remedies without the publicity
that might otherwise give them leverage in the dispute.
Confidentiality also hinders other potential claimants from
learning about the pending dispute.83 This ignorance, combined
with the class action waivers typically found in predispute
agreements, suppresses the likelihood that similar actions will be
brought. More broadly, confidentiality also increases the likelihood
of inconsistent outcomes because arbitrators cannot compare the
facts to previously arbitrated cases.84
D. Arbitrator Expertise
In traditional state courts, judges have general jurisdiction,
meaning that they might handle a divorce one day and an
insurance dispute the next.85 Naturally, no jurist can develop
knowledge in every subject area with as much depth as a specialist

81. Craig Smith & Eric V. Moyé, Outsourcing American Civil Justice: Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 297 (2012).
82. See Anjanette H. Raymond, Confidentiality in a Forum of Last Resort: Is the Use of
Confidential Arbitration a Good Idea for Business and Society?, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 479, 495–
96 (2005). However, American courts do not always enforce such agreements in the presence
of unequal bargaining power. Id.
83. See Smith & Moyé, supra note 81, at 297 (“[T]he secrecy of the arbitration
proceedings leaves other parties injured by similar actions unaware of the availability
of relief.”).
84. Id.; see also Raymond, supra note 82, at 502–03 (explaining the limited precedential
value of arbitration decisions except in subsequent disputes between the same parties).
85. LEE HUGH GOODMAN, NICHOLS ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE WITH FORMS
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION HANDBOOK § 1:37 (2020).
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might. Furthermore, out of concerns for due process, parties cannot
select judges in these public forums.86 The arbitral forum, on the
other hand, allows parties to select arbitrators based on their
relevant subject-matter expertise.87 For instance, in a patent dispute
over an electronic device, “the parties might want an arbitrator who
has experience with intellectual property. The parties might be
more interested in an arbitrator who is familiar with electronics,
and might even want an arbitrator who has expertise in licensing
electronic devices.”88 Subject-matter expertise is also particularly
useful in construction and securities disputes.89 While specialized
knowledge is not necessary in every case, it can enhance both the
efficiency of the dispute’s resolution and the confidence of the
parties in the outcome.90
E. Potential for Bias
On the other hand, there may be a higher risk of bias among
third-party neutrals in an arbitration setting. Larger parties are
often “repeat players” to the arbitration process. In other words,
they arbitrate repeatedly and are therefore more familiar with both
the forum and the arbitrators themselves.91 Such parties are
statistically more likely to win disputes in arbitration than those
who are one-shot users, and the remedies tend to be smaller.92
For instance, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) released
data from 2012–17 on employment cases against Macy’s, which
represented nearly 47% of AAA’s employment arbitrations.93 While
non-Macy’s cases had a 7.5% rate of dismissal, Macy’s cases
had a 93% rate of dismissal.94 Similarly, awards from successful
non-Macy’s claims averaged $328,000, while those against Macy’s
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Robert S. Brandt, Dispute Resolution Clauses in Contracts, 38 TENN. BAR J. 28,
29 (2002).
90. See GOODMAN, supra note 85.
91. Smith & Moyé, supra note 81, at 298.
92. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 205–12 (1997).
93. Genie Harrison, Insight: Forced Arbitration is Bad News for Employees, California
Stats Show, BLOOMBERG L. DAILY LAB. REP. (Aug. 15, 2019, 2:01 AM), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/insight-forced-arbitration-is-bad-news-foremployees-california-stats-show.
94. Id.
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averaged $87,000.95 Such outcomes may result partly from bias on
the part of arbitrators. As Judge Michelle Friedland of the Ninth
Circuit put it:
By nature of the fact that arbitrators are hired and paid by the
parties for whom they conduct private arbitrations, arbitrators
have an economic stake in cultivating repeat customers for their
services. In addition, arbitrators affiliated with an arbitration firm
have an interest in not causing the firm to lose its top clients. At
least to some extent, this means arbitrators have incentives to
make decisions that are viewed favorably by parties who
frequently engage in arbitrations. This feature of private
arbitration, even if distressing, is an inevitable result of the
structure of the industry. 96

No empirical study has conclusively attributed repeat-player
outcomes to arbitrator bias rather than, say, the expertise of the
advocates.97 Indeed, parties in classic litigation might also
experience a home court advantage in courts where they regularly
appear, but this isn’t necessarily the result of judicial bias.98 But
there is intuitive appeal in the idea that, in the words of Justice
Black, “it raises serious questions of due process to submit to an
arbitrator an issue which will determine his compensation.”99
F. Jury Trial Waivers
Arbitration agreements also act as a waiver of one’s right to a
jury trial. The Seventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution states, “In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved.”100 This amendment notably has not been
95. Id.
96. Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 940 F.3d 1130, 1139 (9th Cir. 2019)
(Friedland, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
97. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst
the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 427–29 (2007).
98. Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, 23
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29, 68 (2017) (“[T]he repeat-player effect may be at least as prevalent
in litigation as in arbitration. As Horton and Chandrasekher write, parties ‘who are regularly
embroiled in litigation,’ have long exploited a ‘variety of ways’ to ‘capitalize on their
experience to gain the upper hand over one-shotters.’ So litigation may have a ‘repeat-player
effect’ that equals or even exceeds arbitration’s.” (footnotes omitted)).
99. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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incorporated to state courts,101 and it does not cover all litigation
brought in federal courts—although some state law does grant
additional protections of the right to a jury.102 But courts ordinarily
view waivers of the right to a jury with some level of suspicion, and
such waivers must satisfy high standards before they are
enforced.103 In contrast, the Supreme Court has stated, “The
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration . . . .”104 While some courts recognize the
disparity in these two standards, most enforce jury trial waivers
liberally as long as they are wrapped up in arbitration
agreements.105 As a result, many individuals sign away the right to
be heard by a jury of their peers without the level of knowing
consent that would ordinarily be required.106
G. Class Action Waivers
Many arbitration agreements also prevent individuals from
joining in class actions. Compared to individual litigation, class
actions are much more cost effective for individuals because the
costs of the action are spread over many claimants.107 For
companies, on the other hand, class actions threaten massive costs
because of the potential magnitude of the aggregated claims.108
Corporate legal spending on class actions has steadily increased in

101. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (holding that
the Seventh Amendment only applies to disputes brought in federal courts).
102. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669, 672–73 (2001).
103. Id. at 673 (“While jury trial rights under the Seventh Amendment are admittedly
subject to waiver, waiver is tightly constrained by the following principles: (1) jury trial
waivers may not be lightly implied; (2) courts look at a whole host of factors to determine
whether the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intentional; (3) many courts provide that
the party seeking waiver bears the burden of proof; (4) courts’ holdings render suspect the
use of unsigned or uninitialed documents to support the finding of a jury trial waiver; (5) in
interpreting purported jury trial waivers, courts have stated that they must be
narrowly construed.”).
104. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).
105. Sternlight, supra note 102, at 711–16 (comparing the approaches taken by various
jurisdictions in addressing this dichotomy).
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Presentation at Comparative Perspective
Conference at Geneva, Switzerland: An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United
States 1 (July 21–22, 2000).
108. See id.
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recent years. In 2018 alone, spending increased nearly 10% to $2.46
billion.109 Almost half of that spending was on labor and
employment or consumer fraud disputes.110 Preventing such
actions is obviously an appealing prospect for businesses.
According to the CFPB, over 90% of arbitration clauses in consumer
financial contracts contained class actions waivers.111 As discussed
in section I.B.2 above, the United States Supreme Court has treated
such waivers as broadly enforceable.112
Not only do these waivers increase the costs for potential class
members, but in some cases they might decrease the likelihood that
some actions will be brought at all.113 This is because many claims
can only feasibly be pursued when aggregated among a large
group of plaintiffs, since their monetary value is so small.114 Some
critics therefore argue that class action waivers “undermine[]
challenges to practices such as predatory lending and wage
theft.”115 On the other hand, many disputes—particularly
employment actions—are often too individualized to meet the
commonality requirements for class formation and are thus
inappropriate for collective action anyway.116 At any rate, this
characteristic of many arbitration agreements seems to weigh much
more heavily in favor of companies than individuals.
H. Finality
Unlike in traditional litigation, arbitration awards are
immediately final because there is no classic right to an appeal.117
Instead, the FAA provides some limited means for modifying,

109. CARLTON FIELDS, 2019 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY 7 (2019).
110. Id. at 11.
111. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 2, at 46.
112. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
113. See Smith & Moyé, supra note 81, at 297–98.
114. Id.
115. See JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44960,
MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 12 (2017).
116. Id.
117. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE ARBITRATOR ISSUES AN AWARD 2,
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA229_After_Award_
Issued.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2021).
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correcting, or vacating an award in court.118 Common law has
created some additional bases for courts refusing to enforce
arbitration awards.119 The arbitration agreement itself can further
call for “unrestricted” or “general” submissions, removing the
obligation for the arbitrator to apply the law correctly at all.120 So
while some avenues exist for resolving defects in arbitration
awards, the standards are deferential and provide much more
constricted options than the typical appeals process.
The finality of arbitration can be an advantage for both parties,
especially given the considerable time and expense required in the
appeals process.121 Yet the finality of an arbitration decision can also
present significant risks when the value of a dispute is high or
where error on the part of the arbitrator is likely.122 When there is
perceived arbitrator bias in favor of the larger party, the inability to
appeal might seem particularly oppressive for individuals. To
address these concerns, several major arbitration providers offer
internal, extra-judicial appeals processes, but parties must elect to
use these processes in the original arbitration agreement or in a
post-dispute agreement.123 For those who do not, the same risks
and benefits still exist.124
Clearly, most of the above-referenced features of arbitration
tend to favor companies. But these benefits are not exclusive—the
efficiency, cost effectiveness, privacy, and specialization offered by

118. Section 11 allows modification or correction of an award in cases of miscalculation
or mistake, awards made outside the scope of the matter, or imperfection in form. 9 U.S.C.
§ 11. Section 10 states that an award may be vacated for such causes as corruption or
misbehavior by the arbitrators, fraud, or the arbitrators exceeding their powers. Id. § 10.
119. These include an award being arbitrary and capricious, failing to draw its essence
from the underlying contract, showing manifest disregard for the law, or being contrary to
well-defined public policy. The Basics of Confirming, Vacating, Modifying, and Correcting an
Arbitration Award Under the Federal Arbitration Act and the Texas Arbitration Act, FINDLAW
(Mar. 26, 2008), https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/the-basics-of-confirmingvacating-modifying-and-correcting-an.html.
120. Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 56, 60–61 (2014) (“Unrestricted submissions give the arbitrator discretion
whether to decide the case according to law or according to some other source of norms,
such as the customs in the parties’ industry or the arbitrator’s own sense of equity.”).
121. See Joan C. Grafstein, Yes, You Can Appeal an Arbitration Award, LAW360 (Jan. 28,
2015, 10:01 AM), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/grafstein_appealarbitration-award_law360_2015-01-28.pdf.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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arbitration can often benefit individuals. Because these advantages
can be shared, arbitration is sometimes desirable for both parties.
III. VALUES UNDERLYING ARBITRATION REGULATION
A. Autonomy and Voluntary Consent
As some commentators suggest, party autonomy should be
“the highest priority in the pantheon of arbitration values.”125 This
idea is based on individual liberty and self-determination being
fundamental values in organized democracy.126 Voluntary consent
is an important corollary of this autonomy principle. That is, parties
must enter contracts voluntarily, and personal autonomy is
offended where one party seeks to impose the agreement at
another’s expense.127 Instead, the parties must accept the
terms bilaterally.
But the practical application of these principles is a subject of
dispute. Proponents of predispute arbitration agreements contend
that autonomy is best preserved by enforcing customized
arbitration agreements and with minimal regulation.128 Individuals
should be free to enter transactions, to choose the terms of their
agreements, and to waive their own rights as they wish. Similarly,
they should reasonably be able to expect to have such agreements
enforced against the other party. On the other hand, individuals
who agree to mandatory arbitration rarely do so from such a
theoretical position of autonomous decision-making. Rather,
parties often enter transactions with significantly unbalanced
bargaining power. When the alternative to accepting a predispute
arbitration agreement is losing a job opportunity or being denied
access to desirable—and sometimes indispensable—goods and
services, personal autonomy might be constricted rather
than enhanced.129

125. EDWARD BRUNET, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & STEPHEN J. WARE,
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 5 (2006).
126. Id. at 4–5.
127. Id. at 6–7.
128. Id. at 5.
129. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and
the New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 48 (2005).
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B. Economic Considerations
Proponents of arbitration further contend that it lowers
business costs, which, under competitive conditions, means that
savings are passed on to consumers.130 These reduced costs could
result from smaller jury awards, reduced adverse publicity, more
streamlined procedural rules, fewer claims (especially class
actions), limited discovery, or fewer appeals.131 The assumption
that the savings from these advantages will be passed on to
consumers is based on a principle of economics called the “rate-ofreturn equalization principle.”132 That is, “whatever increases an
industry’s profits ultimately attracts additional capital to that
industry, causing an increase in that industry’s output and
therefore a reduction in its price.”133 The reverse is also true: things
that cut into an industry’s profits ultimately raise prices.
Arbitration advocates thus argue that laws restricting arbitration
work against the advantages described in Part II above and
therefore drive up business costs and therefore prices
for consumers.134
That said, this argument has not been empirically supported.
The CFPB study, for example, “did not find statistically significant
empirical support for the theory that companies pass savings from
their use of arbitration clauses onto consumers.”135 Opponents of
arbitration further point out that savings are passed on to
consumers only under conditions of perfect competition.136 This
requires that there be so many small buyers and sellers that no
single party can influence the market price, that the goods and
services be homogenous, that market entry and exit be easy, and
that there be free access to relevant information.137 Unless these
conditions are met—which, in the world of predispute arbitration
130. Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 89–90 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
131. Id. at 90.
132. Id. at 91.
133. Id. at 92.
134. Id. at 93–99.
135. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 10, at 15.
136. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
75, 93 (2004).
137. Id. at 93–94 (citing WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES
AND EXTENSIONS 401–02 (7th ed. 1998); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 252–53 (5th ed. 2001)).
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agreements, is highly unlikely138—then companies will only
partially pass the savings on to consumers. Moreover, these
marginal savings are likely to be diffuse over a broad set of
consumers while the negative ramifications are concentrated
among those individuals bound by the agreements.139 Thus, the
beneficiaries of these savings are much less likely to feel their effect
than those bearing the costs.
Another economic argument against mandatory arbitration is
that confidentiality removes an important deterrent from
committing bad acts. Although the threat of arbitration with its
associated costs might itself do something to discourage this
behavior, confidentiality protects the company’s behavior against
broader scrutiny. As discussed previously,140 predispute agreements
therefore insulate companies against the likelihood of similar
litigation by other parties. Thus, in a consumer setting, companies
lose incentives for providing quality goods and services,
potentially imposing additional costs on consumers in the form of
defects and decreased value.
C. Individual Rights
Even given these considerations, however, legislators must
weigh economic value against other important concerns
underlying regulation. Many regulations—such as those involving
the manufacture of drugs, tires, and cars—increase costs for
companies and sometimes prices for consumers, but factors like
public health and safety counterbalance these costs.141 Legislation
also requires businesses to employ ethical accounting practices.142
Such regulation might impose higher costs on companies, but
lawmakers have recognized that these costs are outweighed by the
interest of the public in preventing unscrupulous corporate
behavior.143 Similarly, preserving individuals’ right to a public
forum might have sufficient intrinsic value to warrant special
protection irrespective of economic considerations.

138. Id. at 94–95 (discussing how each element of perfect competition fails in most
mandatory arbitration contexts).
139. See id. at 95–96 (discussing the “distributive aspects” of proponents’ economic argument).
140. See supra Section II.A.
141. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 136, at 95.
142. Id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)).
143. Id.
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IV. MOVING TOWARD A MORE FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK
A. Opt-In Arbitration Clauses
As an alternative to both the current system and the changes
proposed in the FAIR Act, this Note proposes that Congress amend
the FAA to enforce predispute arbitration agreements in consumer,
employment, civil rights, and antitrust disputes only when the
parties accept them on an opt-in basis. In other words, the law
would invalidate any adhesive arbitration clause that must be
signed as a condition of employment or obtaining a good or service.
This requirement would extend not only to the contract itself, but
also to the absence of any coercion or unfair manipulation by either
party. Some individuals might understandably feel unspoken
expectations—especially from employers—that fall short of
outright coercion. But due to concerns of administrability, the
individual should be able to point to some overt manifestation of
pressure to void the agreement.
Ideally, an enforceable agreement under this framework would
be clearly distinguished from the rest of the contract to emphasize
that the arbitration clause is optional. It would also contain an
explanation of what rights—such as the right to a jury, the right to
appeal, and the right to join a class action—the individual would
waive by signing such a provision. Most importantly, the
individual would have to independently sign or click the
arbitration provision for it to be enforced as part of the contract.
B. Precedent in Contract Law
Precedent already exists in contract law for provisions which
are valid only if independently accepted. For instance, Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-209 deals with contracts providing that
subsequent modification or rescission can be made only through
a signed writing.144 It states that, when a merchant supplies a
form containing such a provision to a non-merchant, the
non-merchant must separately sign the modification requirement
for it to be enforceable.145 The official comment to the UCC clarifies
that this subsection exists to protect consumers.146 Another analog
144. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).
145. Id.
146. Id. at cmt. 3 (“[I]f a consumer is to be held to such a clause on a form supplied by a
merchant it must be separately signed”(emphasis added)).
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exists in the form of contract addenda, which propose additional
terms to be incorporated into a contract and are enforceable only if
signed by both parties.147 Additionally, in a professional ethics
context, a lawyer cannot require a client to prospectively waive
malpractice liability unless they are independently represented by
counsel in making the agreement.148
C. Legislation Over Rulemaking
George H. Friedman has proposed that such reforms be made
to consumer financial contracts through rulemaking by the CFPB.149
However, a broader legislative solution would be superior to this
approach for two principal reasons.
First, although the authority of the CFPB is expansive, it
is tethered to regulating the provision of consumer financial
products and services.150 But the concerns over mandatory
arbitration clauses extend to employment agreements, as well as
non-financial consumer contracts. Unlike an agency, Congress
could cover this broader subject area without running afoul of its
institutional limits.
Second, agency rules are subject to greater volatility than
legislation. Because the President exerts direct control over
agencies,151 rules can be altered by smaller shifts in the political
winds.152 Agency rules are also vulnerable to attack under the
Congressional Review Act, whereunder Congress can invalidate
a new rule using expedited procedures.153 An opt-in arbitration

147. Cf. Houston v. Willis, 24 So. 3d 412, 418 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (treating an
addendum as an extension of an original contract).
148. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8(h) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
149. See George H. Friedman, What’s a Regulator to Do? Mandatory Consumer Arbitration,
Dodd-Frank, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2014,
at 6.
150. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a).
151. This is true of the CFPB, especially now that the Supreme Court has deemed the
removal protections for its single director to be unconstitutional. See Seila Law LLC v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203–04 (2020).
152. To be sure, the Administrative Procedure Act does provide some restraints on the
Executive’s discretion to change rules for policy reasons. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of
U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–42 (1983).
153. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R3992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA):
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2020). Of course, this law would likely not see much action
if the proposed rules were promulgated in 2021, given that President Biden would likely veto
a joint resolution.
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reform could thus have greater scope and permanence if it were
enacted through legislation, not CFPB rulemaking.
D. Opt-Out Clauses Are Not Enough
Some companies have sought to address concerns over
mandatory arbitration by incorporating “opt-out” clauses into their
contracts. Uber, for instance, uses such a provision in contracts with
its drivers.154 The terms guarantee that the rest of the contract will
still be valid if the driver exercises the opt-out clause, and that the
company will not retaliate against a driver for doing so.155 But the
process is cumbersome, requiring the driver to send a separate
letter or email stating their name and intent to opt out within thirty
days of signing the driver agreement.156 Similar provisions are also
present in many credit card contracts.157
The apparently voluntary nature of these provisions makes
them appealing to courts.158 But while they might seem to protect
voluntary consent, very few individuals read the terms of form
agreements they sign, much less understand them.159 For example,
the CFPB study found that, of credit card customers who were
subject to predispute arbitration agreements, 18.4% were aware of
those agreements160 and only 6.8% knew that they could not sue
their credit card issuer in court.161 As for Uber’s arbitration
agreement, an organized campaign has been necessary to facilitate
many drivers’ exercise of their right to opt out and possibly even to
inform them of the arbitration provision’s existence in the first
154. Technology Services Agreement, Uber Tech., Inc. (Dec. 11, 2015), https://
s3.amazonaws.com/uber-regulatory-documents/country/united_states/RASIER
%20Technology%20Services%20Agreement%20Decmeber%2010%202015.pdf.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Fred O. Williams & Caitlin Mims, Mandatory Arbitration: Most Credit Cards Allow a
Way Out, CREDITCARDS.COM (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-cardnews/avoid-arbitration-study.php.
158. See, e.g., Larsen v. Citibank FSB, 871 F.3d 1295, 1313 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
existence of an opt-out provision strongly weighs against a finding of procedural
unconscionability.”); Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2016) (similar).
159. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read
the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014); see
also Andrew Robertson, The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 179, 188
(2005); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 233 (2002).
160. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 63, § 3, at 23.
161. Id. at 19.
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place.162 The practical effect is that numerous individuals signing
these contracts—perhaps most of them—are likely unaware of the
opt-out option until a dispute arises.
Granted, the “duty to read” is a well-established principle of
contract law.163 That is, “failure to read an agreement before signing
it does not render the agreement either invalid or unenforceable.”164
This presumption has obvious practical necessity: it spares courts
the odious task of line-drawing on the wide spectrum of
understanding which parties may have of the contract terms. It also
gives people greater confidence to enter transactions knowing that
the other party will generally be held to a consistent standard
of performance.
Yet the problem with opt-out contracts does not lie in the duty
to read itself, but in how the standard for consent allocates the
effects of that duty. By default, an arbitration provision containing
an opt-out clause is enforceable unless the opt-out clause is
exercised. This standard of consent shields the arbitration provision
behind the high probability that the details of the opt-out clause
will not be read.165 Thus, opt-out clauses serve little more purpose
than to satisfy courts that predispute arbitration agreements are not
technically procedurally unconscionable. They do not mitigate the
public policy concerns surrounding predispute arbitration
agreements as they currently exist.
On the other hand, mandating opt-in clauses would still respect
the widely accepted duty to read. Consumer and employment
contracts would be enforced, regardless of either party’s failure to
read them before signing. But by requiring the opt-in clause to be
separately clicked or signed, this higher standard of consent would
make it less likely that the arbitration provision be enforced absent
an affirmative decision to accept it. Thus, the ignorance of the less
sophisticated parties would work in their favor—or at least not to
their detriment. These contracts would be voluntary and protect

162. Don’t Let Uber Take Your Rights Away, RIDESHARE DRIVERS UNITED,
https://drivers-united.org/uber-arbitration-opt-out (last visited Mar. 24, 2021).
163. Charles L. Knapp, Is There A “Duty to Read”?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1083 (2015). But see
id. at 1108–10 (denominating the “duty” instead as a “presumption of knowing assent”
because the former term “is not only technically incorrect, but it also encourages judges (and
others as well) to moralize or be condescending to persons who do not read everything
they sign”).
164. Kibler v. Blue Knob Recreation, Inc., 184 A.3d 974, 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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individuals’ interests far more effectively than deceptively similar
opt-out clauses.
E. Advantages Over a Blanket Prohibition
An opt-in arrangement is likewise preferable to banning
predispute arbitration agreements altogether for two principal
reasons. On one hand, it respects the autonomy of contracting
parties and ensures free selection of the dispute resolution forum.
As arbitration law currently stands, most individuals signing
these agreements are not truly autonomous. While they may be
theoretically free to abstain from a transaction, they are functionally
compelled—whether by the necessity of employment or of certain
goods and services—to enter that transaction, and as a result they
cannot refuse arbitration for a dispute arising from it.166
The FAIR Act’s blanket prohibition on predispute arbitration
agreements, on the other hand, would have an opposite but still
undesirable effect. Individuals would never be able to enter
arbitration agreements, even when such agreements would have
desirable benefits like reduced costs. Of course, the bill does not
forbid anyone from arbitrating.167 Rather, it invalidates arbitration
agreements that are made at the predispute stage.168 In theory,
parties would therefore be free to resort to arbitration once a
dispute has arisen. But in practice this would likely never happen.
Where a smaller party has a small or weak claim, the larger party
would benefit from refusing arbitration and instead forcing their
opponent to undergo the substantial costs and hurdles of litigation,
thereby discouraging the action from being brought.169 In such
instances, arbitration would be foreclosed to the smaller party,
despite its potential advantages.
Contrastingly, an opt-in arrangement would maximize
personal autonomy where both alternatives fail. Parties would still
be free to contract, to negotiate their own terms, and to waive their
rights. But they would be permitted to do so without the threat of
losing employment opportunities or access to important goods and
services. And unlike the FAIR Act’s proposal, such an arrangement

166. See supra Section III.A.
167. Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. § 402(a) (2019).
168. Id.
169. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 567 (2001).
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would be minimally paternalistic. This is because, although it
would alter the default bargaining context, it would not ultimately
foreclose any course of action by either party since each can
autonomously consent to either an arbitral or classic litigation
forum. This flexibility would permit parties to tailor their dispute
resolution process to their idiosyncratic needs.
Second, enforcing predispute arbitration agreements on an
opt-in basis would incentivize the company to sweeten the deal for
the individual. If consumers, employees, and other small parties
were on equal ground with larger parties to accept or reject
predispute arbitration agreements, the larger parties would be
pressed to craft the terms of their agreements to be more mutually
palatable. For instance, they might offer to defray some or all of the
costs of the arbitration process, to permit freer disclosure of
information, to exempt certain types of claims from the arbitration
requirements, to allow the smaller party greater input in the
selection of the third-party neutral, or to allow class arbitration.
Larger parties clearly have substantial benefits to gain from
predispute arbitration agreements as they currently exist,170 and
they could cede some of the benefits of the agreement without
breaking even in their cost-benefit analysis. That said, this
balancing phenomenon might be dampened if individuals continue
to breeze past the terms without reading them. But nothing would
prevent companies from placing their opt-in arbitration clauses
prominently to attract attention when it is sufficiently important
to them.
Proponents of the FAIR Act might still argue that these ends can
be achieved just as well by leaving arbitration-related negotiations
for the post-dispute stage. After all, if arbitration is preferable to
both parties, won’t they choose to arbitrate anyway?
The answer is: not necessarily. . . . [T]he incentives to support
arbitration change when the system becomes voluntary. . . . Once
a dispute has arisen, each side will have a view about whether its
claim will fare better in court or in arbitration. As a result, the
parties are unlikely to agree, post-dispute, on a choice of forum. 171

As another commentator put it, “[t]he comparative advantage
of arbitration is that it enables both parties to enter into an
170. See supra Part II (discussing advantages and disadvantages of arbitration for parties).
171. Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 105 (2010).

1672

1673

Opt-In Arbitration

arrangement to manage some of the ex ante uncertainties about
disputes before they arise.”172 For instance, the individual might
exchange the likelihood of a higher recovery for easier access to the
dispute forum, while the company might exchange the likelihood
of prevailing for lower overall costs.173 The mutual value of such a
tradeoff “is lost once the dispute arises and its terms are better
known.”174 Thus, arbitration is likely not a viable option at all
unless the parties agree to it before the dispute occurs.175
CONCLUSION
The FAIR Act deserves praise for its attempt to protect
consumers and employees against predatory business practices.
However, a more effective approach would allow parties to take
advantage of the benefits of arbitration while ensuring that
individuals can do so voluntarily. By implementing an opt-in
standard for enforcement of arbitration agreements, the legislature
could balance these priorities. Doing so would protect party
interests more effectively than either existing arbitration law or a
blanket ban on predispute arbitration agreements.

172. Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration
Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 279 (2008).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
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